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AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN
FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES:
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
HAROLD P. GREEN t
THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT of 1954' opened vast new areas of
economic activity to American enterprise. Under the predecessor
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 2 most important areas of atomic energy
activity were subject to an almost absolute government monopoly, and
the role of private enterprise was limited to participation in the
government's development of military and civilian applications of
atomic energy. The 1954 act broke this monopoly and permitted
private exploitation of this new technology, thereby opening a new
economic frontier. But of perhaps even greater significance to the
American business community was the lifting of barriers to interna-
tional economic activity in the atomic energy field.
Only a very few countries have atomic energy programs which
approach the advanced level of the program of the United States.
Most other countries represent virtually virgin territory, and have
almost a passionate desire for securing the promised blessings of the
new atomic energy technology. Under these circumstances there
are substantial markets for the export of American atomic energy
know-how and materials, equipment, and services necessary to build
an atomic energy technology. The economic potential of these
foreign markets is particularly high in connection with the develop-
ment of nuclear facilities for the production of electric power, since
most other areas of the world have high power costs relative to the
power costs of the United States. This means that economically
competitive nuclear power may be more easily achieved in other
countries, and experience gained there in design, construction, and
operation of power reactors would constitute a valuable asset looking
toward development of competitive nuclear power in the United States.
American industry, quite understandably, can see considerable short-
run and long-run profit, tangibly and intangibly, in participation in
t A.B. 1942, University of Chicago; J.D. 1948, University of Chicago; member
of the Illinois and District of Columbia bars; attorney in private practice, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Consulting Editor, CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter; formerly Office
of the General Counsel, United States Atomic Energy Commission; Acting Counsel,
Subcommittee on Government Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations.
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foreign nuclear power projects. It is the purpose of this paper to
explore the legal framework within which American industry may
seek atomic energy profits through foreign activities.
I.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 reflected the belief that the
United States' lead and superiority over other nations in atomic
energy development gave it an untouchable monopoly position. There
was no recognition that other nations might be able to contribute
ideas or services which would strengthen our own atomic energy
program. Correspondingly, there was an obsession with considera-
tions of secrecy, and statutory barriers were created which would, it
was assumed, protect the lead of the United States. The net result
was a statutory policy of atomic energy isolation.
There was, under the 1946 act, an almost absolute prohibition
against communication of Restricted Data ' to other nations; an
absolute prohibition against export, transfer, or distribution of fission-
able material ' to other nations; 6 and an absolute prohibition against
Americans' engaging "directly or indirectly" in the production of
fissionable material outside of the United States. 7  These prohibi-
tions effectively stifled inter-government co-operation in atomic energy
matters and made it impossible for American enterprise to seek atomic
energy business abroad.
Throughout the entire period, 1946 to 1954, there was only one
relaxation of these statutory prohibitions. In 1951 it became impor-
tant to our own national atomic energy program to co-operate with
another nation's atomic energy program in a specific instance. This
1. 68 STAT. 919, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2011-2281 (Supp. 1954).
2. 60 STAT. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1952).
3. "Restricted Data" is a statutory term which embraces, as a practical matter,
all atomic energy data which AEC believes requires protection in the interest of the
common defense and security. The statutory definition is of such breadth as to
embrace not only atomic energy secrets developed in government programs, but also
such secrets which may be developed by private enterprise wholly independent of
government programs or assistance.
4. The 1946 act prohibited "exchange of information with other nations with
respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes." 60 STAT. 766 (1946),
42 U.S.C. §1810(a)(1) (1952). The prohibition was, of course, interpreted as
applying to all information on atomic weapons. It did, however, leave open the
possibility of exchange of information in a limited area not involving the use of
atomic energy for industrial purposes.
5. "Fissionable material" under the 1946 act is equivalent to "special nuclear
material" under the 1954 act. See text at note 22.
6. 60 STAT. 760 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a) (3), 1805(d) (1952).
7. 60 STAT. 760 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §1805(a)(3) (1952).
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episode demonstrated that other similar occasions might arise when
the United States program could gain from co-operation with other
nations. Under this impetus, an amendment to the 1946 act was
enacted ' which authorized severely circumscribed exchanges of Re-
stricted Data, as well as assistance by American firms to foreign atomic
energy programs, upon a determination by a unanimous Atomic Energy
Commission, and a determination by the President based upon a
recommendation by the National Security Council, that the "common
defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not
be endangered." A further condition of such co-operation was a find-
ing that the other nation's security standards were adequate. This
meant that the United States could co-operate with other nations in
atomic energy matters only in the rare instances in which our own
national security would be substantially promoted thereby and where
it could be affirmatively stated that our own security would not be
endangered, and only where the other nation had security standards
comparable to ours. These factors, plus the extremely cumbersome
procedures required for instituting co-operation, made the amendment
virtually useless, except for dealing with the immediate specific situa-
tion which prompted it. There was still no opportunity for American
enterprise to capitalize on foreign atomic energy markets.
By 1954, the assumptions underlying the atomic energy program
had undergone considerable change. The United States had lost its
monopoly in the field of atomic weapons, and it had been demon-
strated that hoarding our atomic energy secrets could not forestall
development of nuclear weapons by other nations. It was recognized
also that the United States could not easily relax its national monopoly
over atomic energy so as to permit private enterprise to exploit its
civilian applications within the United States, without at the same
time permitting other nations-particularly those, like Belgium, which
have been major suppliers of uranium-to share in the peaceful appli-
cations. An overriding consideration was the concern that American
prestige would suffer, and American industry lose out, "if some other
nation were to be permitted to assume leadership in bringing the
peaceful fruits of atomic energy technology to a world eager to share
in them." 9
8.65 STAT. 692 (1951), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(3), 1810(a)(3) (1952).
9. Testimony of Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, United States Atomic Energy
Commission, Hearings Before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and
H.R. 8862, to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 591
(1954).
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II.
CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE 1954 ACT.
It was against this background that the provisions for interna-
tional co-operation were written into the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
These provisions do not completely unlock the doors to foreign atomic
energy activity by American firms. The door remains locked, but a
key is provided for opening the door under certain limited circum-
stances and subject to severe government control.
The cornerstone of government control over foreign atomic energy
activity is the statutory "agreement for cooperation," a bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and another nation for atomic energy
co-operation. As will be pointed out below, not all atomic energy
activities of American business outside the United States require an
agreement for co-operation, but it is safe to say that most important
activities of this kind may be conducted only under such an agreement.
Such an agreement is regarded as necessary to assure that the United
States' security interest in information and nuclear materials is pre-
served, and to assure, before any assistance is given to the atomic
energy programs of other nations, that there has been a high-level de-
termination by responsible officials of the United States that the con-
templated activity is in consonance with the best interests of the
United States.
The Atomic Energy Act requires " that each agreement for co-
operation include specific guarantees on the part of the other nation.
First of all, there must be a guarantee that "security safeguards and
standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be main-
tained." n This does not require any specific level of security efficiency,
adequacy, or comparability to United States standards, but only that
the other nation guarantee to maintain whatever security standards may
be agreed upon and expressed in the agreement. Since this statutory
requirement is primarily related to protection of Restricted Data, and
since there have been only three agreements for cooperation to date
under which Restricted Data may be communicated to other nations, 12
there is not a great deal of experience as to its significance. But these
three agreements involve some interesting variations. The agreement
for cooperation with Belgium, which was transmitted to the Presi-
10. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2153 (Supp. 1954).
11. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(a)(2) (Supp. 1954).
12. To date 27 agreements for civilian atomic energy co-operation have been
negotiated. Of these, 24 specifically prohibit communication of any Restricted
Data. The agreements which authorize communication of Restricted Data are those
with Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
[VOL. 1: p. 9
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dent on June 15, 1955, recites a Belgian guarantee to maintain safe-
guards and standards prescribed in a separate, unpublished agreement
of June 15, 1955.13 The agreement with Canada, which was trans-
mitted to the President on June 14, 1955, similarly refers to a separate
agreement of June 15, 1955, which, it is stated, reflects that the United
States .and Canada "have adopted similar security safeguards and
standards in connection with their respective programs." 4 The third
agreement, with the United Kingdom, includes a guarantee that the
United Kingdom will maintain safeguards and standards "in accord-
ance with the applicable security arrangements" between the Atomic
Energy Commission and the British Atomic Energy Authority but
contains no concrete indication that a specific security agreement
exists.'6
The act also requires guarantees that the other nation will not
use material transferred to it by the United States under the agree-
ment for cooperation for weapons or military purposes or related
research,'" or transfer such material to unauthorized persons or beyond
its jurisdiction, except as may be specified in the agreement.'1
After an agreement for cooperation has been negotiated and its
terms agreed to, the AEC is required to submit the proposed agree-
ment to the President for his approval and for his authorization to exe-
cute the agreement.' It is necessary that the President make a written
determination that performance of the agreement will promote and will
not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and secu-
rity. 9 The proposed agreement must then be submitted to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, together with the President's approval
and determination, where it must lie for thirty days while Congress is
in session, after which period the agreement may become effective."0
The Joint Committee may, of course, exercise a form of veto power
over an agreement for cooperation or specific provisions of an agree-
ment. Ordinarily, this could be accomplished by moral or political
suasion, but if such suasion failed the Joint Committee could probably
13. Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Belgium, Article
X, Paragraph B, S. REP. No. 1051, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955).
14. Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Canada, Article
X, Paragraph A, S. RP. No. 1051, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1955).
15. Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the United
Kingdom, Article IX, Paragraph A, S. REP. No. 1051, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 30
(1955).
16. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(a)(3) (Supp. 1954).
17. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(a)(4) (Supp. 1954).
18. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(a) (Supp. 1954).
19. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(b) (Supp. 1954).
20. 68 STAT. 940, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153(c) (Supp. 1954).
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succeed in rushing prohibitory legislation through the Congress within
the thirty-day period.2 1
With an understanding of the general nature of the concept of
"agreement for cooperation," we may now proceed to a general con-
sideration of the ground rules for international co-operation in atomic
energy matters. This consideration may best be described in terms
of the Act's specific restrictions on international activities.
A.
Distribution of Special Nuclear Material.
Special nuclear material is the statutory term for material capable
of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear fission or
nuclear transformation.22 It is at one and the same time the fuel
which makes reactors operate and the material produced as a result
of reactor operation. In addition, special nuclear materials may have
considerable utility, apart from reactor technology, in biological, indus-
trial, or research activities. It is also the basic nuclear material of
atomic weapons.
All special nuclear material within the United States, and all such
material produced within the United States, is owned by the Govern-
ment under the 1954 act.' There is no latitude for private ownership
of special nuclear material within the United States. The AEC will,
however, license possession or use of special nuclear material by private
persons and will distribute special nuclear material to licensees. Private
parties may also be licensed to produce special nuclear material 24 to
which the Government instantly acquires title by operation of law. 5
Licensees may not transfer or export special nuclear material outside
of the United States.2" The AEC itself may, however, distribute spe-
cial nuclear material to other nations under an agreement for co-
operation.2 7  No nation could practicably go forward with construction
of a nuclear reactor until it was assured of a supply of special nuclear
21. "Experience has shown that for the most part when the joint committee is
reasonably united in its opposition to anything that .is being proposed by the Com-
mission, it does not go through." Remarks of Rep. Morano, 100 CoNG. REc. 11025
(daily ed. July 23, 1954). An example of the influence of the Joint Committee is
to be found in the very first agreement for cooperation under the 1954 act sub-
mitted to the Committee. The Joint Committee objected to a provision of the
proposed agreement with Turkey as "open-ended," whereupon AEC promptly re-
wrote the provision in question so as to meet the .objection.
22. 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(t) (Supp. 1954).
23. 68 STAT. 929, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp 1954).
24. 68 STAT. 936, 937, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133, 2134 (Supp. 1954).
25. 68 STAT. 930, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072 (Supp. 1954).
26. 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2077(a)(2) (Supp. 1954).
27. 68 STAT. 931, 42 U.S.C.A. §2074 (Supp. 1954).
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material with which to operate it. Since, at the present time, the
United States appears to be the most promising source of such ma-
terial, any nation of the free world entering the reactor field would
undoubtedly desire to conclude an agreement for cooperation. 28
B.
Distribution of Source Material.
Source material is defined in the act to include uranium and
thorium, or other materials determined by the AEC to be essential to
the production of special nuclear material.29 Private ownership of
source material is permitted, but except for quantities of source ma-
terial which are in AEC's opinion unimportant, no person may trans-
fer, receive, or possess source material without an AEC license.8"
There is no prohibition against export of source material by private
persons, but such export must be undertaken pursuant to a license,
except where there is an exception to the license requirement because
the quantity involved is unimportant."' In addition AEC itself is ex-
pressly authorized to distribute source material outside the United
States either pursuant to an agreement for cooperation or pursuant to a
simple determination that such activity will not be inimical to the in-
terests of the United States.82
C.
Distribution 'of By-product Material.
By-product material is a statutory concept embracing radioactive
material yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to radiation in-
cident to the production or utilization of special nuclear material."
Radioisotopes fall within this category. No person may transfer, re-
ceive, or possess by-product material without an AEC license.84 AEC
is expressly authorized to distribute by-product material outside the
United States, or to license licensees to do so, either pursuant to an
agreement for cooperation or pursuant to a simple determination that
such distribution will not be inimical to the common defense and
security.3 5
28. This is demonstrated by the haste with which 24 nations have rushed to
enter agreements for cooperation involving research reactors, and that each of them
has accepted the standard form agreement for cooperation devised by AEC.
29. 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(s) (Supp. 1954).
30. 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C.A. §2092 (Supp. 1954).
31. Ibid.
32. 68 STAT. 933, 42 U.S.C.A. §2094 (Supp. 1954).
33. 68 STAT. 923, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(e) (Supp. 1954).
34. 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C.A. §2111 (Supp. 1954).
35. 68 STAT. 935, 42 U.S.C.A. §2112 (Supp. 1954).
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D.
Production and Utilization Facilities.
The concepts of "production facility" 6 and "utilization facility" 8
embrace any equipment or device which AEC determines to be capable
of producing or of using special nuclear material (or, in the case of
utilization facilities, using atomic energy) in such quantity as to be of
significance to the common defense and security or the public health and
safety. AEC has ruled that all nuclear reactors fall within these con-
cepts, and that the concepts also embrace facilities for separation of
isotopes of uranium or plutonium and facilities used for the processing
or fabricating of special nuclear material. 8 Construction, operation,
possession, and transfer of production facilities and utilization facilities
may be undertaken only pursuant to an AEC license,89 and such licenses
may be granted only for activities which are under or within the juris-
diction of the United States, 4° except that licenses may be granted for
the export of production facilities or utilization facilities pursuant to
an agreement for cooperation. 4' AEC also has authority to include
important component parts of production or utilization facilities within
the "production facility" or "utilization facility" concepts 4' although
it has determined, for the time being at least, not to do so." If any
component parts are brought within these concepts, a license for their
export may be issued by AEC, without an agreement for cooperation,
upon a written determination that the particular export will not con-
stitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.44
E.
Dissemination of Information.
The act imposes severe limitations upon the communication of
atomic energy Restricted Data to other countries. Restricted Data
may be communicated only as authorized by the AEC in accordance
with the standards and restrictions imposed by the act. The act pro-
vides that Restricted Data within certain specified areas, covering vir-
36. 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(p) (Supp. 1954).
37. 68 STAT. 924, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(v) (Supp. 1954).
38. Proposed Regulations on Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,
20 FED. REG. 2486, §50.2(a), (b) (1955).
39. 68 STAT. 936, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2131 (Supp. 1954).
40. 68 STAT. 937, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133(d), 2134(d) (Supp. 1954).
41. Ibid.
42. 68 STAT. 923, 924, 42 U.S.C.A. §2021(p), (v) (Supp. 1954).
43. Supra, note 38, § 50.2 NOTE.
44. 68 STAT. 939, 42 U.S.C.A. §2139 (Supp. 1954).
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tually the entire field of civilian applications of atomic energy, may be
communicated to other nations as authorized by AEC, but only under,
and in accordance with, an agreement for cooperation.45
F.
The Section 57(a) (3) Catch-all.
The broadest and most troublesome restriction upon foreign eco-
nomic activities under the act is Section 57(a) (3) which provides:
"Section 57. Prohibition.-
"a. It shall be unlawful for any person to-
"(3) directly or indirectly engage in the production of any
special nuclear material outside of the United States
except (A) under an agreement for cooperation made
pursuant to Section 123, or (B) upon authorization
by the Commission after a determination that such ac-
tivity will not be inimical to the interest of the United
States." (Emphasis added.) "
Willful violation of section 57(a) (3) carries heavy criminal penal-
ties.47
The italicized language was found in precisely this form in the
original Atomic Energy Act of 1946.8 The 1951 amendment to the
1946 act "' created the first exception to the prohibition, but AEC's
authority to grant exceptions to the prohibition did not provide a prac-
tical means for authorizing harmless foreign activities which might fall
within the scope of the extremely broad prohibition because of the cum-
bersome procedures required to authorize an exception and because of
the necessity for a determination that the contemplated foreign activity
would substantially promote and would not endanger the common de-
fense and security. Accordingly, when the 1954 act was under con-
sideration, AEC requested a liberalization of the manner for authorizing
exceptions, a liberalization reflected in the excepting clause quoted
above.
The breadth of the prohibitory language of Section 57(a) (3) is
quite obvious. It is not particularly difficult to read a fairly definite
meaning into the phrase "engage in the production of any special nuclear
45. 68 STAT. 942, 42 U.S.C.A. §2164 (Supp. 1954).
46. 68 STAT. 932, 42 U.S.C.A. §2077(a)(3) (Supp. 1954).
47. 68 STAT. 958, 42 U.S.C.A. §2272 (Supp. 1954).
48. 60 STAT. 759 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(C) (1952).
49. See note 8, supra.
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material outside of the United States." Nor is there any great difficulty
in reading a meaning into this phrase when modified by the adverb
"directly." It is the adverb "indirectly" which introduces tremendous
breadth and uncertainty into the prohibition. Precisely what conduct
constitutes "engaging directly or indirectly in the production of special
nuclear material"? The legislative history of the 1946 act provides
virtually no insight as to what Congress had in mind in enacting the
original prohibition. There are, however, a number of quite meaningful
clues in the 1954 act's legislative history.
When the President initiated legislative consideration of the 1954
atomic energy legislation by transmitting to the Congress his proposals
for amendments to the 1946 act, he stated:
"Matters that have arisen under this provision have been
ordinary business or commercial activities which nevertheless fall
within the broad statutory prohibition because they might con-
tribute in some degree, however minor, to foreign atomic energy
programs." 50
During the hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on the proposed legislation, Representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, gave this description of the scope of
the prohibition:
"Now, directly or indirectly engage in the production of spe-
cial nuclear material, has to do with teachers, salesmen, instructors,
or anything (sic) else who indirectly engage in the production of
atomic energy." 51
The Report of the Joint Committee on the 1954 legislation states that
the exceptions are:
.. . designed to permit those who might teach abroad, or who
might wish to sell unclassified services or parts of facilities .
or who might wish to help build facilities abroad [to] have an
opportunity to do so with prior Commission approval." 5
And AEC's Deputy General Counsel has characterized section
57(a) (3) as being designed to assure that "none of our nationals
should be permitted to help any other country, either directly or
indirectly," in the production of special nuclear material without
authorization.5"
50. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommenda-
tions Relative to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, H.R. Doc. No. 328, 83rd Cong.
2d Sess. 4 (1954).
51. Hearings, supra note 9, at 698.
52. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
53. Address of Edward Diamond, AEC Deputy General Counsel before the
Mineral Law Section of the American Bar Association, August 23, 1955.
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All of this clearly reflects that section 57(a) (3) can be given an
extremely broad interpretation so as to prohibit any activities by United
States nationals which might contribute in any degree to foreign atomic
energy programs unless, of course, the activity is specifically authorized
by AEC or is authorized under an agreement for cooperation. Thus,
a college physics professor who accepts a visiting professorship at a
foreign institution might require AEC authorization since, pre-
sumably, he would assist in the training of nationals of that country
who might ultimately participate in production of special nuclear ma-
terial in the atomic energy program of that country. 4 Authorization
might also be required for an American consultant who advises a
foreign government or firm on matters relating to its atomic energy
program. Indeed, the provision could conceivably be interpreted as ex-
tending to the sale of cement or nails by American firms for use in
construction of atomic energy facilities abroad. In the light of the
above-quoted statements about the meaning of section 57(a) (3) its
potential scope would appear to be of almost infinite breadth. This
would place a most substantial burden upon American business to
obtain prior authorization before engaging in any activities which might
assist foreign atomic energy programs.
It should be noted also that the section 57(a) (3) restriction cuts
across all of the other specific restrictions on foreign atomic energy
activities outlined above, since any export of atomic materials, facili-
ties, or component parts, and any communication of Restricted Data
to foreign interests, would also involve a section 57 (a) (3) problem.
It is apparent that the breadth and uncertainties of section
57 (a) (3) have been quite troublesome to American enterprise. Ques-
tions have arisen, for example, as to whether section 57 (a) (3) restricts
American firms from sending abroad advertising brochures involving
no Restricted Data or other classified matter, 55 or from sponsoring un-
classified exhibits at international atomic energy exhibitions such as
the Trade Fair in conjunction with the recent atomic energy con-
ference at Geneva .5  An AEC spokesman has conceded that section
57(a) (3) :
54. Or because "there is even the remotest possibility that by doing so he would
free another professor in the foreign country for work in that foreign country's
atomic energy plants." Remarks of Sen. Stennis, 100 CONG. R.C. 11542 (daily ed.
July 26, 1954).
55. Address of Edward Diamond, note 53, supra.
56. AEC refused to permit General Dynamics Corporation to display at the
Geneva Conference a model of an experimental airplane reactor being developed
by it. The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1955, p. 1. At a Press Conference
with officials of the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference on July 5,
1955, newsmen queried AEC Chairman Strauss and Commissioner Libby as to
11
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". . ,has created problems both for the Commission and for
industry, particularly as it has either restricted or discouraged
American business firms from advertising or holding initial dis-
cussions relating to the sale of facilities, component parts, or
reactor materials, and American consultants from offering their
services abroad without authorization. ,, 57
III.
THE PATTERN FOR ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES ABROAD.
American enterprise is faced with a difficult and unusual situation
in adapting to the stringent ground-rules for foreign economic activity
in the atomic energy field. The necessity for licenses, authorizations,
or bilateral agreements for cooperation, coupled with the heavy over-
tones of security considerations, gives rise to considerable uncertainty
as to what may be accomplished and makes it quite difficult to for-
mulate long-range plans." The degree to which American enterprise
will be able to compete successfully in world atomic energy markets is
dependent upon the manner in which AEC chooses to implement the
vast regulatory authority conferred upon it in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
The AEC's record in establishing clearly defined guides to foreign
atomic energy activity has been spotty. Very few authoritative, help-
ful statements were made by AEC during the first year after enactment
of the act, a period in which AEC was apparently concentrating its
efforts on negotiating and consummating the 27 bilateral agreements
for cooperation. During this period AEC did virtually nothing to
clarify the permissible role of American enterprise, and, indeed, did
nothing to dissipate the widespread concern that the provisions of the
act would be interpreted in a broadly restrictive manner. Thus, it
was reported that AEC had refused to authorize an American corpo-
ration to advise a group of corporations in a friendly country, on the
basis of unclassified information only, as to which of a number of pos-
sible reactor types should receive their concentrated efforts.59  Sim-
whether exhibits by American firms at the Conference would be within the scope
of Section 57(a) (3). Both Chairman Strauss and Commisioner Libby appeared to
lose the import of the question and it went unanswered. Transcript of Press Con-
ference, pp. 21-22.
57. Address of Edward Diamond, note 53, supra.
58. As one American industrialist has been quoted: "Have you ever tried to sell
somebody something when you couldn't tell him how good your product is, why
it is good, what it will do, how long it will last or how much better it is than a
similar product?" Cotton, Patent Rights Muddle Threatens Export Trade of U.S.
Nuclear Firms, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 4, 1955, pp. 1, 10.
59. Gemmill, Atomic Secrecy-It Balks U.S. Firms Seeking Foreign Sales,
But Curtain May Lift, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 1955, p. 1.
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ilarly, it was reported that American firms have been operating under a
considerable competitive handicap, occasioned by delays in getting AEC
approval for export, in trying to obtain foreign markets for unclassi-
fied, plentiful, radioisotopes for medical use.'
The major problem was Section 57(a) (3). AEC did, apparently,
assist individual firms in handling specific problems by furnishing in-
terpretations as to whether contemplated activities fell within the con-
cept of "engaging directly or indirectly in production," and by author-
izing exceptions to the prohibition where appropriate in specific sit-
uations."' But AEC's actions in these cases were not made public
as possibly applicable precedents and so did not furnish assistance to
the business community generally. It was not until September, 1955,
that AEC made the first meaningful public statement as to its views on
the scope of the prohibitory language. It revealed then that its General
Counsel did not regard the mere transmittal abroad of unclassified and
generally available information as within the scope of the prohibition,
although, it was stated, the situation might be different if the trans-
/,mittal were coupled with the rendering of services requiring the ap-
plication of technical judgment.62  Also, it was revealed that AEC
did not regard ordinary advertising or business promotional activities
as within the scope of the prohibition, although a final commitment to
sell goods or services might be.6"
It was not until late September and early October of 1955 that a
definite and authoritative pattern for foreign atomic energy activities
by American enterprise began to crystallize. The crystallization took
the form of a major AEC decision as to implementation of Section
57 (a) (3), and a clarification of the role of private firms under bilateral
agreements for cooperation.
A.
Implementation of Section 57 (a) (3).
On October 3, 1955, AEC announced a far-reaching decision
which, in effect, eliminates the problems and uncertainties of Section
57(a) (3) and establishes a climate within which American firms may
be able to engage effectively in world developments of atomic energy.
AEC's decision 64 was that no atomic energy activities conducted by
60. Ibid.
61. Address of Harold L. Price, Director of AEC's Division of Civilian Ap-
plication on September 27, 1955, before the Atomic Industrial Forum.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (1955).
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Americans on an unclassified basis in friendly foreign countries (i.e.,
not on the Department of Commerce's list of Communist-dominated
countries) would be inimical to the interests of the United States.
Accordingly, pursuant to this decision and the statutory authority of
Section 57(a) (3) of the act, AEC issued a blanket authorization for
Americans to engage in any such activities. Classified atomic energy
activities abroad could, in any event, be conducted only under an agree-
ment for cooperation,6 5 so the effect of AEC's determination is to re-
move all impediments to foreign atomic energy activities in friendly
countries, except to the extent that the impediment must, under the
statute, be removed by an agreement for cooperation. Section
57(a) (3) remains an effective regulatory instrument only with respect
to contemplated atomic energy activities in Communist-dominated
countries. Firms interested in doing unclassified business in friendly
countries may, as a practical matter, forget that there is any such pro-
vision as Section 57(a) (3), except for the fact that AEC will require
reports by firms engaging in certain types of activity within the scope
of this provision.66
B.
The Role of Enterprise Under Agreements for Cooperation.
In much the same spirit, AEC officials have indicated that agree-
ments for cooperation will be regarded as self-executing within a fairly
wide area, so that activities within their scope may be conducted in
many instances without specific AEC approval.67  Each agreement
establishes a specific area of activity within which cooperation between
the United States and the other nation will be carried out, and ex-
pressly provides that private firms in both countries may deal directly
with private firms in the other country as well as with the other gov-
ernment. Specific AEC approval for activities under the agreements
is required only for transmittal of classified information, or for con-
summation of transactions requiring an AEC license or authorization.6"
The effect of this crystallization of AEC policy is to give American
enterprise virtual carte blanche to seek any type of foreign atomic energy
business in friendly countries, at least to the extent that classified
information is not involved. Indeed, it would appear that American
enterprise would be permitted to do anything in a friendly country
65. Note 45, supra.
66. 20 FED. RE. 7399 (1955).
67. Address of Algie A. Wells, Office of the AEC General Counsel, on Septem-
ber 27, 1955, before the Atomic Industrial Forum.
68. Ibid.
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which has not entered into an agreement for cooperation which could
be done under any of the agreements for cooperation already consum-
mated except those with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium,
which embrace the exchange of Restricted Data. Thus the importance
of the bulk of the agreements for cooperation as creating a charter for
American atomic energy activities abroad is greatly reduced, and the
principal advantage of the existing agreements for cooperation (ex-
cept those with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium) is that
they make possible development of reactor programs in other countries
through establishment of the availability of United States special
nuclear material.
It should not be assumed, however, that these enlightened and en-
lightening policy decisions by AEC will in themselves enable American
firms to engage in foreign atomic energy programs with the ease and
certainty with which they conduct other foreign activities. There re-
main substantial legal hurdles peculiar to the atomic energy business.
Although AEC's action has given Americans carte blanche to seek
foreign atomic energy business and in principle to engage in any type
of unclassified activity, or even in classified activity if there is an agree-.
ment for cooperation, final commitments to engage in certain projects
may still require an AEC license or authorization. Thus, an AEC
license or AEC authorization will be required, both under and in
the absence of an agreement for cooperation, for the export of produc-
tion or utilization facilities," source material,7" and by-product ma-
terial.7 ' Similarly, specific AEC approval is required before Restricted
Data may be transmitted,7 2 and private firms in both countries are
responsible for assuring that any firm in the other country with which
they deal pursuant to an agreement for cooperation is authorized under
the laws of its own nation to receive the materials or services involved
in any transaction.7"
It would appear, therefore, that there remains a fairly substantial
area within which the Atomic Energy Commission retains discretion
and authority to permit or prohibit foreign atomic energy activities by
Americans. Specific standards for AEC's exercise of these powers do
not exist, and the heavy emphasis on "common defense and security"
in atomic energy law makes it not unlikely that security considerations
69. See note 39, supra, and note 41, supra.
70. See note 31, supra.
71. See note 34, supra, and note 35, supra.
72. This requirement is established in the agreements for cooperation with the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium.
73. This requirement is established in each of agreements for cooperation nego-
tiated to date.
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will play a large part in AEC's determination whether a license or
authorization should be issued for contemplated foreign activities. If
security considerations will in fact play a role in these determinations,
a cloud of considerable uncertainty will continue to exist. It would be
most difficult for enterprise to operate in this field if, for example, issu-
ance of an AEC authorization or license were contingent upon investi-
gation and consideration of the precise nature of the foreign country's
atomic energy programs, its political relationships with the United
States, and the security implications of the specific firms and personnel
in both countries who are involved in the transaction.
Where the contemplated activities may be conducted only under
an agreement for cooperation, there are additional hurdles to be over-
come. If American firms solicit business which would require an agree-
ment for cooperation which has not yet been negotiated, the business
discussions would necessarily have to be conducted in somewhat of
a vacuum because of Restricted Data problems and because of the
contingency as to whether an agreement for cooperation can be nego-
tiated and the uncertainty as to its terms if it can be negotiated. If
a tentative understanding is reached to be implemented when an agree-
ment for cooperation is finally consummated, the American firm would
find itself in the politically uncomfortable position of having an agree-
ment for cooperation (which would be understood to be in large part
for its benefit) negotiated and run through the procedure for making
it effective.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
The statutory framework for foreign atomic energy activity by
American enterprise represents a blending of three considerations.
First of all, it represents an effort to maintain American prestige
abroad and to strengthen the international position of the United States
in the era of the cold war by demonstrating that the United States
is eager to. bring the blessings of atomic energy to mankind as well
as in strengthening our atomic armaments. Secondly, it represents
an effort to permit American business to capitalize on foreign atomic
energy markets. And, third, it represents an effort to achieve these
results without adversely affecting our national security. The third
consideration is reflected in the restrictions and prohibitions of the act
discussed above and is necessarily controlling in the statutory scheme,
since steps to accomplish the first two purposes may be undertaken only
within the bounds of the security framework.
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The position of American atomic enterprise in the competitive race
for foreign markets is considerably less than optimum because of the
security restrictions. All other factors being equal, other countries,
whose atomic industry is not so fettered by security chains, are in a
much better position to capture the world atomic energy markets. To
the extent that American enterprise possesses any present advantage
in the competitive race, the advantage lies in the superior resources
and know-how of the United States. This advantage, as the Geneva
Conference demonstrated, may be more illusory than real, and in any
event will undoubtedly dwindle with the passage of time.
Pressures mounted during the Summer of 1955 for liberalization
of the ground rules for foreign atomic energy activities by American
enterprise. In response to these pressures, AEC has taken dramatic
action to remove the Section 57(a) (3) impediment and to establish
a general climate of freedom for Americans to seek and capture foreign
atomic energy markets. It must now be hoped that AEC's creditable
action in establishing this climate will not be nullified by obsessive and
excessive application of security concepts in its handling of specific ap-
plications for licenses or authorizations.
Security considerations are of paramount importance in consider-
ing the role of American enterprise in world development of atomic
energy applications. It is important, however, that security considera-
tions be applied realistically rather than through the assumption that
ostrich-like concealment will preserve our present atomic energy ad-
vantage. We must strip away the superstition and mythology which
have surrounded atomic energy security policies since 1946, and con-
sider the realities of the situation. Our security restrictions have not
prevented other nations from developing nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons or from matching our top performance in many atomic energy
areas. Indeed, it was demonstrated at Geneva that many of our
penuriously hoarded secrets are not secrets at all. If American enter-
prise is barred from or impeded in atomic energy activities abroad,
the only consequence will be that enterprise of other nations will ac-
complish what American enterprise could have accomplished.
The decision of our Government, expressed in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, to open the atomic energy industry to private exploitation
cannot be implemented in a half-way manner. Effective private ex-
ploitation of atomic energy opportunities cannot be reconciled with
effective security, and any attempt to reconcile them can result only to
the disadvantage and in the foolish appearance of both.
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